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ABSTRACT | I argue that Rancière’s philosophy is anti-Machiavellian in the sense that his distinction between police 
and politics is not an originary division, but rather a gap in the sensible fabric of society. He thus moves from politics 
as a theory of agency to an aesthetic cartography of situations. It is a question of mapping the emergence of a 
political problem within a singular situation, and the ethics of such mapping is the insistence on the irreducible 
contingency of an existential choice of the problem. I will elaborate some new concepts (“sites of incommensu-
rability,” “experimentation,” “fragmentation of social space”) and specify how the three logics of identification, 
dis-identification, and over-identification are three ways of constructing and dealing with situated problems.
K E Y WO R D S  | Politics, democracy, social sciences, political conflicts, ethics, political movements (Thesaurus).
Rancière antimaquiaveliano: cartografía estética, sitios de inconmensurabilidad y procesos de 
experimentación
R E S U M E N  | Defiendo la idea que la filosofía de Rancière es antimaquiaveliano, en el sentido en que su distinción 
entre policía y política no es una división primaria, sino una brecha en el tejido sensible de la sociedad. No piensa 
entonces la política en términos de una teoría de agencia sino como una cartografía estética de situaciones. Se 
trata de trazar la emergencia de un problema político dentro de una situación singular, y la ética de tal carto-
grafía es la insistencia sobre la contingencia irreductible de una elección existencial del problema. Elaboro 
conceptos nuevos (“sitios de inconmensurabilidad”, “experimentación”, “fragmentación del espacio social”), y 
especifico como las tres lógicas de identificación, desidentificación y sobreidentificación son tres maneras de 
construir y tratar problemas situados.
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Política, democracia, ciencias sociales, conflictos políticos, ética, movimiento político 
(Thesaurus).
Rancière antimaquiaveliano: cartografia estética, lugares de incomensurabilidade e processos de 
experimentação
R E S U M O  | Defendo a ideia de que a filosofia de Rancière é antimaquiaveliana, no sentido em que sua diferen-
ciação entre polícia e política não é uma divisão primária, mas sim uma brecha no tecido sensível da sociedade. 
Não pensa então a política em termos de uma teoria de agência, mas sim como uma cartografia estética de 
situações. Tenta-se estabelecer a emergência de um problema político dentro de uma situação singular, e a 
ética dessa cartografia é a insistência sobre a contingência irredutível de uma escolha existencial do problema. 
Elaboro conceitos novos (“lugares de incomensurabilidade”, “experimentação”, “fragmentação do espaço 
social”) e especifico como as três lógicas de identificação, desidentificação e superidentificação são três maneiras 
de construir e tratar problemas situados.
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Política, democracia, ciências sociais, conflitos políticos, ética, movimento político 
(Thesaurus).
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tualizaciones. Francia/Colombia”. No contó con financiación.
** Estudiante de doctorado en Filosofía Política de la Université Paris Diderot-Paris 7 (Francia). Profesor catedrático de la Universidad 
de los Andes (Colombia) y de la Universidad Autónoma de Colombia y, profesor invitado de la École Normale Supérieure, Université 
d’Etat d’Haïti. Miembro de los grupos de investigación de Laboratoire du Changement Social et Politique (LCSP), Université Paris 
Diderot-Paris 7; Archipel des Devenirs, Centre de recherche sur l’utopie (Francia) y Projet ECOS-Norte, “Entender la subjetivación 
política hoy. Experiencias y conceptualizaciones”, Universidad de los Andes y Université Paris Diderot-Paris 7. Entre sus últimas 
publicaciones se encuentran: “Rancière, Marx y Claudette Colvin: tiempo, saber, memoria y estrategia de la política”. Ciencia Política 
10 (19): 125-150, 2015 y “Subjectivation et désidentification politiques. Dialogue à partir d’Arendt et de Rancière” (en coautoría con 
Etienne Tassin). Ciencia Política 10 (19): 193-223, 2015. * afjeld@gmail.com
rev.estud.soc. No. 55 • enero-marzo • Pp. 151-162 • ISSN 0123-885X • eISSN 1900-5180 · DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7440/res55.2016.10
O T R A S  V O C E S152
Jacques Rancière conceives of the political situation 
as a paradoxical “disagreement” between two 
incommensurable ways of investing and configuring 
the sensible —a consensual police logic and a dissensual 
democratic logic. There is a strong tendency in 
contemporary French political philosophy to understand 
this distinction between police and politics as an 
originary division in the Machiavellian sense of the 
term —as a dichotomy in which the constant renewal 
of conflict between the nobles who want to dominate 
and the people who do not want to be dominated is 
what keeps society together and “indefinitely delays” 
its dissolution into civil war. That is to say, conflictive 
disorder is “paradoxically” generative of political order, 
an order that lasts only in so far as conflict is kept 
alive through the different struggles that traverse the 
social sphere and resist domination by the nobles. This 
Machiavellian originary division is reconceptualized 
in contemporary French political philosophy as being 
constitutive of democracy. Democracy is the political 
regime based on indeterminacy and contingency because 
it is nothing other than the space in which these conflicts 
take place —where the terms of the people against the 
nobles are substituted, as in the case of Miguel Abensour, 
by democracy versus the state. This democratic 
remobilization of Machiavelli constitutes a predominant 
branch of contemporary French philosophy, one that 
typically and quite uncritically includes Rancière and his 
concept of dissensual democracy among its proponents.
I will argue that Rancière cannot be subsumed into this 
tradition, and that he is in fact anti-Machiavellian in the 
sense that the distinction between police and politics is 
not that of an originary division, but rather of a gap in the 
very fabric of the sensible between two incommensurable 
logics (l’écart). This hypothesis will permit us to 
reconstruct and radicalize Rancierian philosophy. More 
concretely, it will enable us to define some new concepts 
from within his thought, revolving around the idea of the 
gap, namely the concepts of “sites of incommensurability,” 
“experimentation,” “fragmentation of social space” and 
“utopian over-identification.” In order to specify the 
singularity of his political philosophy, we will define how 
he moves from politics understood as a theory of agency 
to politics as an aesthetic cartography of situations, and 
how he “decenters” traditional philosophical-political 
thought by dissolving conceptual guarantees that any 
logic or agency is adequate to a situation. More precisely, 
for Rancière it is a question of mapping the emergence 
of a political problem within a singular situation, and the 
ethics of such mapping is the insistence on the irreducible 
contingency of an existential choice of the problem.
Machiavelli in Contemporary French 
Political Philosophy
Marxism has undoubtedly shaped the landscape of 
French political philosophy in the 20th century, as such 
an ever-present current of thought, especially from the 
1940’s through the 70’s with Jean-Paul Sartre and Louis 
Althusser as its central proponents, that a large number 
of important emerging thinkers have formulated 
their positions either through solidarity with, critical 
reconceptualization of, or “constructive” rejection of 
Marxism. The last case is characteristic of the above-
mentioned branch of contemporary French philosophy 
based on a democratic remobilization of Machiavelli, 
the origin of which can perhaps be traced back to 
the founding of the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie 
by Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis in 1948, 
in which Jean-François Lyotard participated notably 
until its dissolution in 1967. Lefort and Castoriadis also 
wrote for the journal Textures, which lasted from 1969 
to 1975, along with Miguel Abensour, who may also 
be considered the most important proponent of this 
Machiavellian-democratic branch today.
Largely as a reaction against the totalitarian experiences 
of communism in the Stalinist USSR, and as an attempt 
to locate totalitarian tendencies on a theoretical 
and conceptual level in Marxism, this Machiavellian 
tradition defends democracy as a regime of perpetual 
indeterminacy and division which —through its very 
dynamics of conflict— wards off totalitarian unification, 
bureaucratisation and State domination. As Lefort puts 
it in commenting on Machiavelli: “Order is not instituted 
through a rupture with disorder; it merges with a 
continual disorder” (Lefort 2010, 518, my translation).
This is what he calls “the principle of the internal 
division of society,” based on the Machiavellian idea 
of an originary division between the nobles who seek 
to dominate and the people who seek to avoid being 
dominated. As Machiavelli famously puts it in his 
analysis of the Roman Republic: “I think that those 
who condemned the tumults between the nobles and 
the plebe blame what was actually the principal cause 
of liberty in Rome and that they are more attentive 
to the noise and cries caused by the tumults than the 
good effects that they produced” (Maquiavelo 1987, 
39, my translation). Reconceptualized as a conception 
of democracy, this tradition thus recasts conflict as 
central to the vitality of society. One might say that 
the whole network of concepts —conflict, democracy, 
the state, emancipation, and so forth— is based on the 
logic of this originary division. As Abensour puts it: 
“The conceptual horizon according to which the idea 
of savage democracy is to be approached is thus that 
of the originary and irreducible division of the social, 
its enigmatic identity —the ordeal of the uncontrollable 
that allows the indetermination of the social realm, 
and its necessary inner opposition, to unfold freely” 
(Abensour 2007, 251, my translation).
We might, in order to introduce the concept of this 
Machiavellian originary division, insist on two of its 
basic elements. Firstly, the originary division exists 
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only insofar as there are opposing forces actively 
keeping it alive through the constant renewal of 
conflict. Machiavelli understood these opposed forces 
as the nobles versus the people, whereas Abensour 
reconfigures this distinction in terms of the state as 
the agent of domination and democracy as the agent 
of emancipation: “if the State is inseparable from 
servitude, inversely the democratic revolution is 
inseparable from a destruction, or from an intention of 
destruction, of State power” (Abensour 1998, 127, my 
translation).1 Secondly, the constant renewal of conflict 
is actually what accounts for the health and vitality of 
the political regime. If the conflict ceases, the originary 
division dissolves, and —as Machiavelli would put it— 
the city-state deteriorates into civil war. The opposed 
forces produce, through their very conflict, the vitality 
and sustainability of democracy. Abensour says: “Is 
democracy not the form of society that, unsatisfied with 
merely recognizing the legitimacy of internal conflict, 
comprehends conflict instead as the originary source of 
an ever renewed invention of liberty” (Abensour 2007, 
251, my translation).
By suggesting that it is in the dynamics of perpetual 
democratic conflict that liberty asserts itself and that 
a sustainable political regime constructs itself, this 
tradition carves out a theoretical position between 
Marxism and liberalism, criticizing them both for 
their inability to recognize conflict as both irreducible 
and generative of a democratic society. As Martin 
Breaugh puts it in commenting on Abensour: “For our 
divided societies haunted by the spectre of secession, 
the political will of fabricating unity and harmony is 
irresistible” (Breaugh 2006, 133, my translation). The 
criticisms they propose are thus negative descriptions 
of the specific ways in which this self-perpetuating 
democratic conflict is displaced by ideas of unification 
and consensualization.2 In other words, in the logic 
1 We note the similarity with the Aristotelian concept of 
energeia that is being as pure actuality: the constant renewal 
of conflict generates its own condition of possibility wherein 
it actualizes itself. Democracy, as the regime wherein 
constant conflict is possible, is sustained by nothing else 
than the constant conflict that generates it. Democracy, in 
this conceptualization, is energeia, which also explains why 
Hannah Arendt is an important reference point for both 
Lefort and Abensour, since her concept of bios politikos —the 
specifically political “mode of being” of man— is in fact an 
elaboration of the Aristotelian concept of energeia.
2 As Abensour puts it: “Under the influence of a reinterpreted 
Machiavelli (Le travail de l’oeuvre, 1971), Claude Lefort defends 
the idea that every human city is ordered and constructed 
by an originary division in which the division of desires 
manifests itself: the desire of the nobles to command and 
oppress, and the desire of the people to be neither commanded 
nor oppressed —the desire of freedom. We see that within this 
intelligibility of the political, every manifestation of the social 
is inhabited, haunted, by the threat of its own dissolution” 
(Abensour 2007, 250, my translation).
of this Machiavellian tradition, both Marxism3 and 
liberalism4 depoliticize politics by displacing its very 
essence —democracy understood as originary division 
or as self-perpetuating conflict.
There is a strong tendency to read Rancière as part 
of this tradition, which implies supposing that his 
distinction between police and politics is an originary 
division. It seems to me that by dispelling this 
Machiavellian reading of Rancière, his philosophy 
becomes much more complex and, I would add, much 
more interesting and important.
Anti-Machiavelli!
The hypothesis that we will develop is thus the 
following: Rancière is anti-Machiavellian because 
the distinction between police and politics is not an 
originary division. There is nothing in Rancière that 
would permit subsuming local, singular struggles to the 
general regime of savage democracy, inscribing a locally 
situated political actor within the generality of struggle 
against forces of domination —as Abensour puts it: 
“Is democracy not the form of society that institutes a 
3 This Machiavellian-democratic tradition rejects Marxism 
on account of its “economic determinism” which is supposed 
to reduce the political to the social, or to turn politics into 
an epiphenomenon of the economic base. According to 
this logic, Marxism displaces the originary division by 
defending a model of unification through the universal 
project of revolutionary emancipation of the proletariat. It 
is thus criticized for being based on a teleological rationality, 
on a hierarchical and bureaucratizing organization of any 
political movement due to its avant-garde-party structure, 
on displacing the contingency and indeterminacy of 
democracy and replacing it with a process of fabrication of 
the new society yet to come, on an instrumentalization of 
politics, etc. As Lefort puts it: “Unlike Marx, Machiavelli 
understands social division as constitutive of political 
society, and, thus, as insurmountable. [...] It is clear that 
praise of the tumults is not linked to any faith in a final 
stage, as in the case of Marx, a stage in which the causes of 
the division would be suppressed. Tumults, insofar as they 
are stirred up by the people’s desire for freedom, are good” 
(Lefort 2010, 568, my translation).
4 The Machiavellian-democratic tradition rejects liberalism 
as a consensual or technocratic logic that “closes” the spaces 
of conflict and insurgency by seeing them as a threat to 
“good order” instead of understanding them as generative of 
democracy and liberty. Liberalism thus depoliticizes conflictive 
democratic life by seeking principles of good governance or 
justice, by conceiving of a deliberative democracy through 
consensual registers, by reducing the political to the legal, 
by emptying spaces of conflict through representative 
democracy, or by delimiting politics to discussions on the just 
distribution of goods. This logic is quickly assimilated with 
the state, understood as the institutionalized organization of 
society that wards off any (originary) division and dissensus 
in its consensualized spaces. Philosophically, we find a critique 
of thinkers like Rawls and Habermas, or Plato and Hobbes 
here, because they seek principles of consensus and order 
and conceive of conflict as undermining the well-functioning 
bases of society.
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human link across political struggles and that, by this 
very institution, renews its tie with the origin of liberty 
that is always in need of rediscovery?” (Abensour 2007, 
274, my translation). Disagreement, the relation between 
police and politics, is not an originary division between 
opposed and distinct agents or agencies, but a gap in the 
fabric of the sensible between incommensurable logics.
By moving from the concept of originary division 
to the concept of gap, one uproots and modifies the 
whole network of concepts and fundamentally alters 
the very logic of politics. The difference between the 
Machiavellian tradition and the anti-Machiavellian 
thought of Rancière is that of a complete rupture and 
thus a paradigmatic difference. Before explaining the 
concept of the gap more precisely, I will indicate the 
difference with four ideas that I will develop and justify 
throughout the text.
Firstly, we are moving from a theory of political agency 
to an aesthetic cartography of political situations. 
Secondly, we are moving from a social space divided 
by an originary division to a social space fragmented 
by multiple gaps. Thirdly, we are moving from a binary 
logic for thinking about contradictory relations of 
forces to a fluid and strategic field of incommensurable 
relations of forces. Fourthly, we are moving from 
politics as resistance against domination and as the 
ever-renewed construction of liberty, to politics as 
strategic experimentation and the construction and 
treatment of situated problems.
In order to better understand these differences between 
the originary division and the gap, I will first develop 
the idea of what it means for the relation between 
police and politics to be a gap.
Rancière describes this relation as “the contradiction 
of two worlds lodged in a single world” (Rancière 
1995, 49, my translation). How should we understand 
this paradoxical definition? Initially we can point out 
that “two worlds lodged in a single world” means that 
there are two different types of territories investing 
the same space, that is to say, two different modes of 
organizing the connections and oppositions between 
the same bodies, things, and words in one social space. 
More precisely, whereas the social order identifies 
and codifies these bodies, things, and words according 
to a consensual register, democracy dis-identifies 
and decodifies these same bodies, things, and words 
according to a dissensual register, with the two 
laying out very different “landscapes of the possible.” 
But with respect to this initial observation we have 
to specify the type of relation that exists between 
these two territories in the same space. This relation 
is not really one of contradiction; it is rather one of 
incommensurability. As Rancière puts it: “In this way 
the bringing into relationship of two unconnected 
things [namely the police and politics] becomes 
the measure of what is incommensurable between 
two orders: between the order of the unegalitarian 
distribution of social bodies […] and the order of the 
equal capacity of speaking beings in general. It is 
indeed a question of incommensurables, but these 
incommensurables are nevertheless measured 
in regard to each other” (Rancière 1995, 67, my 
translation). Let us first emphasize the paradox of 
what Rancière claims here: By definition, if two things 
are incommensurable they cannot be measured one 
against the other because there is simply no common 
measurement between them. However, it is precisely 
this paradox that Rancière seeks to think about and 
to elaborate; it is this paradox that characterizes the 
disagreement or more generally the concept of the 
gap. We can thus understand the incommensurable 
relation between police and politics in the following 
way: The two worlds, or the two territories, invest 
the same social space, the same surface, the same 
bodies, things, and words, and they are at one and the 
same time incommensurable (they have no common 
measurement) and measured one against the other. 
Two worlds then, with modalities and dynamics so 
different that they have no common measurement, 
but which are nonetheless tangled up in a single 
space, joined together in the form of a knot, precisely 
because they invest and overlap in the same space.
This concept of the gap will allow us to define a 
Rancierian concept of experimentation, as well as the 
idea of social spaces as being fragmented by gaps. The 
gap is, as we have defined it, a site of incommensurability, 
a space of connections between two incommensurable 
logics. Because of the incommensurability of the 
connections, there is no internal contradiction that 
already carves out a path of resolution or that already 
privileges a certain constellation of connections as 
the outcome of a dialectical process. If we are dealing 
with a form of anti-Machiavellianism, we are thus 
also dealing with anti-dialectics. In the space of this 
incommensurability, there can only be processes 
of open, contingent and strategic experimentation. 
We can thus conceptualize experimentation as the 
concrete processes that play, join, disconnect, fumble, 
strategize, configure and create within the spaces of 
these gaps. And we can define a social space as a space 
fragmented by gaps inciting experimentations. In 
relation to experimentation, we are here generalizing 
what Rancière says about thought: “Thought, for it to 
have something to work on, has to have points where it 
jams, where it measures itself against something that 
it cannot absorb” (Rancière 2012, 101, my translation). 
We might say that what puts not only thought, but also 
social landscapes or political situations to work, are the 
aporias, the tensions, or the gaps that traverse their 
fabric and rationality, because it is precisely there that 
they are pushed to experiment, at the point where they 
measure themselves against what they cannot absorb, 
against their sites of incommensurability.
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It is thus possible to specify why we are moving from a 
theory of political agency to an aesthetic cartography 
of political situations. This is because it is no longer 
a question of identifying the function of politics or 
of defining what actually makes a political agent 
political —which is what Abensour is doing in defining 
democracy as the perpetuation of the originary division 
through conflictive resistance against the state.5 What 
Rancière proposes is an aesthetic cartography of the 
sites of incommensurability that fragment social 
spaces and that constitute the aporetic points of open 
and contingent experimentation reconfiguring the 
coordinates of the distribution of the sensible. It is 
no longer a question of conceptualizing the role a 
political actor plays in relation to a political regime 
such as democracy, but rather a question of mapping 
the concrete experimentations taking place in a 
given situation —the reconfigurations of the sensible 
in terms of temporalities, horizons, inventions of 
practices and reinvestments of laws and institutions, 
reterritorializations within the network of social codes 
and concrete spaces, modes of critique and polemic 
rearrangement of social relations. The Machiavellian-
democratic originary division is supposed to explain 
“what is really taking place” in a political situation 
(inscribing the singularity of the conflictive situation 
into the generality of democracy as a self-perpetuating 
regime of indetermination), whereas Rancière’s 
aesthetic cartography searches for the gaps and the 
processes of experimentation in the very immanence 
of the situation.
The reading of Rancière that I propose can thus be summed 
up in two points. Firstly, we no longer understand the 
distinction between police and politics as an originary 
division, as a dichotomy or as any kind of binary logic, but 
as a specific gap between two incommensurable logics that 
fragments the social space and incites processes of open, 
contingent and strategic experimentation.6 And therefore, 
5 As Abensour says: “Democracy is not the accompaniment 
of a process that would entail the disappearance of 
the State in a smooth space without any rough edges, 
but rather the determinate institution of a conflictive 
space, of a space against, of a agonistic scene where two 
antagonistic logics face each other, where there develops 
a struggle without respite between the autonomization 
of the State as form and the life of the people as action” 
(Abensour 1998, 126, my translation).
6 This point leads, perhaps surprisingly, to relativize and 
even minimize the importance of the idea of equality within 
Rancière’s specifically political work. Even if Rancière 
retains equality as a central notion in On the Shores of Politics 
and Disagreement, it is nevertheless reconceptualized with 
respect to his earlier work. In The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
equality was a social relation based on horizontal principles, 
but in his political thought equality becomes an operative 
principle related to interruption of the police order. This 
means that equality is merely the logic of the actions that 
interrupt and block this order, the actions that open up the 
political space of dissensus, but equality in this sense does 
not predetermine the social relations that populate this 
secondly, we no longer understand his conceptualization 
of politics as a theory of agency or of action; we are 
rather dealing with an aesthetic cartography mapping 
the fragmented construction of social spaces through its 
gaps as experimental sites of incommensurability. We will 
introduce a third point here to which we will return later: 
There are not just two incommensurable logics —police and 
politics— that fragment social spaces and dynamics, but in 
fact three —police, politics, and utopian over-identification.
Police and Emancipation as Operative 
Concepts
Starting with these three points, it is possible 
to elaborate some immediate consequences for 
Rancière’s main political concepts. Firstly, the 
category of the police is not, as is commonly supposed, 
a static order of conservative domination, but rather 
a dynamic and strategic order that can be better or 
worse depending on the problems that it constructs 
and seeks to deal with. Secondly, the state cannot 
be understood as a domain of domination or as any 
kind of predefined agency (as Abensour intends), 
but one that should be understood as a multitude of 
laws, practices, institutions, spaces, actors, etc. that 
can function according to different logics. There is 
thus a very important difference between the police 
as a consensual logic, and the state, in the sense that 
the devices of the state can be configured in both 
consensual and dissensual ways depending on the 
immanence of the situation.7 Thirdly —and this is 
the point that perhaps most obviously presupposes a 
complexification of Rancierian philosophy, but from 
within said philosophy— because the gaps are not 
incarnated by any agency, but rather form part of 
a situation as sites of experimentation. This opens 
up conceptually due to the fact that emancipatory 
movements are themselves ambiguously traversed 
political space —which might be, for strategic reasons and 
to a certain extent, hierarchical. The political criticism 
that Rancière directs at the logic of equality in The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster: Jacques Rancière, La Mésentente, (1995, 58-59). 
This political reconceptualization of equality is not taken 
into account in the reading of Rancière (1991) by Todd May, 
who thinks of political dissensus in terms of the horizontal 
social relations outlined in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, thus 
presenting an “anarchistic” version of Rancière, Todd May 
(2008). Our reading of Rancière is thus opposed to May’s, 
due to a different reading of the political concept of equality.
7 As Rancière puts it: “The forms of democracy […] are in 
no way oblivious to the existence of elected assemblies, 
institutional guarantees of freedom of speech and 
expression, state control mechanisms. They see in these 
the conditions for being exercised and in turn modify them. 
But they do not identify with them.” (Rancière 1995, 141, my 
translation.) And: “That which is normally seen to be the 
place of politics, that is, the set of State institutions, is not 
a homogeneous place. Its configuration is determined by the 
relations between the political logic and the police logic” 
(Rancière 1995, 56, my translation).
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by these three different logics. A consensual police 
logic and an over-identificatory utopian logic may 
be part and parcel of a dissensual emancipatory 
movement. That is to say, democratic movements may 
be fragmented by these gaps from within, just as the 
state may be.
Thus, an important difference in relation to the 
Machiavellian tradition is that emancipation is not 
the dynamic that carries the fate of the world on its 
shoulders due to the way in which it s to democracy 
as a regime of self-perpetual conflict, it is rather 
a dynamic that inserts itself singularly into and 
reconfigures a network of practices, laws, words, 
spaces and institutions. It has its own horizons, 
distributions of possibilities and impossibilities, 
strategies, capacities and workings that might as 
well, for strategic reasons, reproduce domination 
as dispel it. In other words, Abensour believes 
there is a conceptual guarantee that emancipation 
is the adequate dynamics for the problem of 
politics because its fundamental or “real” role is 
to perpetuate the originary division of democracy 
against the state.8 Emancipation is thus the answer 
to the problems of politics. With Rancière, however, 
it seems that this conceptual guarantee is dissolved. 
Because emancipation is no longer rooted in a theory 
of agency, it becomes instead an operative concept 
in the aesthetic cartography. It is an operative 
concept in the sense that what matters is its singular 
and territorialized reconfigurations —the specific 
procedures, horizons, strategies, tensions and 
problems produced by its dis-identification— but 
it can no longer conceptually guarantee its own 
adequacy in relation to the situation it reconfigures. 
The consequence may be surprising and will almost 
certainly seem perverse in the eyes of democratic 
Machiavellians: In certain cases, a police logic may be 
better than an emancipatory logic; in certain cases, 
consensus may function better than dissensus. This 
is related to a connected decentering: What matters 
here is not the quality of the agent and the logic of the 
agency, but the choice of a problem and the capacity 
to deal with it.
We are thus facing one of the most mysterious claims 
of La mésentente, one that Rancière only mentions 
in passing: “The police can procure all sorts of goods, 
8 This idea of defining what politics is “really” about is part 
of the definition and the critique that Rancière proposes of 
political philosophy. As he puts it: “This operation by which 
philosophy expels from itself the disagreement is therefore 
naturally connected to the project of ‘really’ doing politics, 
of realizing the true essence of what politics talks about. 
Philosophy does not become ‘political’ because politics is an 
important object that requires its intervention. It becomes 
so because settling the situation of the rationality of politics 
is a condition for defining what is supposed to be properly 
philosophical” (Rancière 1995, 15, my translation).
and one police can be infinitely preferable to another 
one. This does not change its nature, which is the only 
thing we are questioning here” (Rancière 1995, 54, my 
translation). What if, going beyond the consideration 
of its “nature” (its consensual logic) only, and 
contextualizing its functioning in concrete situations, 
we had to relativize it in the sense that it is not simply a 
domain or agency of domination but a strategic dynamic 
that may also have positive impacts depending on the 
problems it chooses and the way it deals with them? 
What if the question is not simply one of domination 
versus emancipation, but the ability to pose the “right” 
problems and to experiment in dealing with them?
How to Constitute a Political Problem 
Identification, Dis-Identification, and 
Over-Identification
I think this is where we can see why Rancière claims 
he is not a political philosopher. The reason lies in the 
way he rethinks what constitutes a political problem. 
Instead of defining the “real” problem of politics, as 
Abensour does —perpetuating the originary division 
through a constant renewal of democratic conflict—, 
it seems to me that Rancière focuses instead on the 
concrete conditions of the emergence of a problem: 
In what circumstances does the problem arise? How 
is it situated? Who enunciates it? And who is able to 
hear, understand, and invest it? With his aesthetic 
cartography, Rancière is precisely trying to think of the 
network of subjective investments revolving around 
the constitution of problems addressing society. If 
there is a scene of disagreement, there is a group of 
people dis-identifying themselves from the social order 
by interrupting its functioning in order to materialize 
the problems. Take for instance the Arab Spring: There 
was a large group of people in Tahrir Square calling 
themselves the “people of Egypt,” who dis-identified 
from their social roles, functions and identities, thus 
creating a rupture in the functioning of the social order 
by this demonstration of equality and materializing 
radical problems, metonymically concentrated in this 
case in the name of “Hosni Moubarak.”
There is a critical capacity here, an effort to address 
problems facing society, emanating from this 
demonstration of equality by people with no title or 
formal right to pose such problems —problems too 
radical to be posed within the specific consensual 
police configuration of Egyptian society. The 
question that Rancière asks, it seems to me, is not 
how these people configure a public space of plurality 
or a savage democracy resisting the domination of 
the Egyptian state; it is rather what the problems 
expressed by these voices are, how they concretely 
reconfigure social spaces and temporalities, how 
they reinvest their social roles and functions in 
order to give weight to these problems, how these 
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problems and subjectivations interact with the social 
order in the form of the police, and how the different 
forces investing or resisting these problems deal 
with them. It is through such processes that we can 
see change, if we can see it at all —considering that 
the disagreement between police order and politics 
is precisely a site of incommensurability that incites 
processes of open and strategic experimentation on 
both “sides.”
The political question for Rancière is therefore not 
the traditional “What is politics?” question of political 
philosophy, but rather “What are our concrete 
existential problems and how can we deal with them?”
As Gilles Deleuze puts it in his book on Henri Bergson: “It’s 
the solution that counts, but the problem always gets the 
solution that it merits on account of the way it is posed, 
the conditions in which we determine it to be a problem, 
the means and the concepts that we have to pose it” 
(Deleuze 2011, 5, my translation). So, how is a problem to 
be posed with Rancière? That is, how is the way a political 
problem is constructed within the different logics of 
identification (police, consensus), dis-identification 
(politics, dissensus), and over-identification (political 
philosophy, utopia) to be analyzed?
Utopian Over-Identification
Let us start with the third logic. In addition to consensual 
police logic and dissensual political logic, in La mésentente 
Rancière defines a third logic that he denominates 
“political philosophy.” This is often passed over as being 
simply a criticism of philosophical theory, rather than a 
third logic on the same level as police and politics, a third 
way of configuring the sensible that functions in concrete 
situations. We will instead pose the hypothesis that it is a 
logic to be included in the aesthetic cartography, so that the 
political situation is not simply the disagreement between 
police and politics, but a field of gaps engendered by the 
incommensurable “relations” among three different logics: 
identification, dis-identification and over-identification. 
Rancière says that in political philosophy it is a question 
of “suppressing the difference between politics and 
police. The principle of the philosophers’ politics is the 
identification of the principle of politics as an activity with 
that of the police as a determination of the distribution 
of the sensible that defines the parts of individuals and 
of parties” (Rancière 1995, 97, my translation).9 Political 
philosophy is thus different from the police, because it is 
9 Rancière also says the following about political philosophy: 
“What is called ‘political philosophy’ might well be the set 
of operations of thought whereby philosophy tries to rid 
itself of politics, to suppress a scandal in thought proper to 
the exercise of politics. This theoretical scandal is nothing 
more than the rationality of disagreement” (Rancière 1995, 
15, my translation).
the a priori suppression of the difference between police 
and politics. It configures a horizon wherein disagreement 
would be impossible, a horizon wherein the social order 
is, or rather will be, organized in such a way that every 
part will necessarily correspond to its identity —a horizon 
that excludes from the outset any excess, dissensus or 
democracy. If this is the role of political philosophy in 
relation to police and politics, then how can its internal 
functioning as a utopian over-identification be analyzed 
more precisely?
It seems to me to function according to a logic of 
correspondence: On the one hand, correspondence 
between an everyday social identity or function —such 
as that of a bus driver, an immigrant, a philosopher, 
a woman, a carpenter, a prisoner, etc. —and on the 
other, a utopian over-identification —the territories to 
which this social identity is assigned in a harmonized 
or “utopianized” web of social relations. It is a 
correspondence between a determinable material (social 
identity) and a determinant ideal (utopian over-identity). 
Political philosophy in this sense is the project of 
configuring the utopian over-identification of every 
social function, of realizing the correspondence between 
the social identities and the utopian over-identities, of 
fabricating a new world that corresponds to the utopian 
distribution of social relations.10
If over-identification thus functions according to a logic 
of correspondence between a determinable material 
and a determinant ideal, or between an identity and 
an over-identity, the form of the problem is that of 
teleological adjustment: the task of balancing the two 
variables of the correspondence. Any social problem 
or disorder thus becomes a symptom of the lack of the 
over-identity. This logic seems to be evident among the 
utopian socialist societies in 19th century France, where 
all the problems of (capitalist) society are understood 
as symptoms of the lack of the utopian society that is 
yet to come, and where the concrete, utopian societies 
were spaces of experimentation with the teleological 
fabrication of this utopian society. However, we will 
focus our study on how this over-identificatory logic 
seems to have been operative in the French government 
policy that created the first undocumented workers 
known as the sans-papiers in France in 1972.
10 This logic seems to correspond to Derrida’s criticism of 
Francis Fukuyama in Espectros de Marx as incarnating 
one of the Marx’s spectres, an idealist logic: “Let us accept, 
provisionally, the hypothesis that everything that goes 
badly in the world today only measures the hiatus between 
an empirical reality and a regulatory ideal [...] The worth and 
the evidence of the ideal are not compromised, intrinsically, 
by the historical inadequacy of the empirical realities. 
From here [...] the appeal to a certain spirit of the Marxist 
critique is still important and should continue indefinitely 
being necessary to denounce and reduce as much as possible 
the hiatus, to adjust ‘reality’ to the ‘ideal’ in a necessarily 
infinite process” (Derrida 1998,100, my translation).
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Said government policy was based on the idea of 
moving from an “endured and anarchical immigration” 
to an “organized immigration” (Barron et al. 2011, 
6, my translation). The policy thus played on the 
projection of a social order where there would be no 
“anarchical” excesses to disturb the smooth running 
of immigration in which every part would correspond 
to its consensual identity. What this in fact entails is 
precisely an over-identification of the immigrant, in 
two different senses.
Firstly, the social identity of the “immigrant” is read as 
a negative lack of over-identity, and thus considered 
“anarchical and endured.” This is different from police 
identification, in which the “immigrant” identity is given 
through the distribution of laws, institutions, practices, 
social codes, etc., and is thus an assigned position 
within a functional network rather than the symptom 
of a lack. Secondly, this social identity is inserted into 
a teleological horizon measured by over-identification 
—the fabrication of an “organized immigration.” The 
problem is therefore posed as a problem of teleological 
adjustment: how to bring the social identity— the 
(negatively over-identified) “anarchical” immigrant —to 
the over-identity— the “organized” immigrant? How 
is the over-identity to be fabricated? This is the way a 
problem is posed within the logic of over-identification.
But there is a gap here that is presupposed by 
over-identification as part of its very logic. The way 
that “political philosophy” “[suppresses] the difference 
between politics and police” is by inscribing the 
consensual identity into the teleological trajectory 
of an over-identity. It thus opens up a site of 
incommensurability between police identification 
and utopian over-identification inciting processes of 
experimentation. The problem is the same for the 
utopian socialists as for the French government: how 
to concretize the over-identity in the police order 
of practices, of circulations and of discourses, in the 
ordered configuration of everyday life? In other words, 
how to reconfigure the laws, practices, institutions, 
social codes, etc. of the social order in order to move 
from anarchical immigration to ordered immigration? 
What the over-identificatory logic has to experiment 
with, as part of its very logic of teleological adjustment, 
is the police order.
Thus, for instance, in 1972 the government prohibited 
any regularization, any attribution of visas to persons 
already present in French territory. Before this, visas had 
normally been given to anyone who was working, even if 
they had no visa or had only a tourist visa when they were 
hired (Barron et al. 2011, 8). The new government policy 
thus reconfigured the police, just as it reconfigured the 
distribution of places, as well as the functionality and the 
modes of visibility of the bodies occupying them, and the 
set of possibilities and impossibilities attached to these 
places in order to ensure that immigrant workers no 
longer would be able to legalize their presence in French 
territory. This was not a simple administrative change, 
but one that changed a whole constellation of codes, 
rules, laws, practices and institutions and relegated the 
undocumented immigrant worker to a condition of public 
invisibility and legal exclusion. Thus there was a change in 
the consensual identity of the immigrant worker.
But if the utopian socialists and the French state both 
experimented with the same gap and thus formally 
configured the problem in the same way (teleological 
adjustment) in 1972, all the difference lies in the 
problems they chose. The problems that the utopian 
socialists chose were the misery and exploitation of 
the working class, and the utopian over-identity they 
configured and tried to fabricate was supposed to be 
the “solution” to all of the evils and sufferings inflicted 
on the working class by the logic of capital. What the 
French state was doing was to “protect” the nation from 
anarchic foreign elements disturbing the “smooth” 
functioning of its social systems. When it comes to a 
choice of problems, it seems natural, at least from a 
leftist perspective, to sympathize with the utopian 
socialists and to be critical of the French state.
Let us understand this as an indication of the move 
from a theory of agency to the aesthetic cartography of 
situations. We see that over-identification is an operative 
concept that does not entail —as would be the case 
within a theory of agency— any conceptual guarantee 
of adequacy or non-adequacy in regards to a concrete 
situation. It depends on its specific construction, and 
more specifically on the problems it chooses and the 
way it tries to deal with them. As an operative concept, 
over-identification can prove either better or worse 
depending on the situation, depending on the problems 
it chooses to deal with. However, if over-identification 
incites processes of experimentation with the police 
order, how are problems constructed and dealt with 
from within the police order itself?
Police Identification
Consensual police identification is the distribution 
of social codes, the codification of social spaces, the 
configuration of proper ways of being, doing and 
saying, and the web of institutions, practices and laws 
that regulate the everyday social order within which 
individuals are assigned their places. It does not function 
by correspondence and teleological adjustment, but 
rather by distribution, codification and assignation. 
That is, the police do not presuppose any over-identity 
regarding which the social identities should embark on 
journeys of teleological adjustment; the police merely 
configure a certain “landscape of the possible” as the set 
of possibilities and impossibilities that defines a social 
situation by codifying an identity and assigning it a place. 
In other words, utopian over-identification presupposes 
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police identification in order to project these “everyday” 
police identities into a future harmonization of social 
relations. The police, however, merely assign a body to 
a place, and the police codification of a body accounts 
for its possibilities and impossibilities in the situation 
wherein it finds itself, its “modes of saying, modes of 
doing and modes of being.” In this sense, the form of the 
problem is given in modifiable combinations among the 
consensual possibilities and impossibilities that define 
the social order at any given time, i.e., the ways one can 
play with, reconnect and disconnect the relations within 
the entire set.
As Rancière says: “[Consensus] is the construction 
of a world where we are faced with necessity, where 
there is no possible, no choices but the choice of the 
best way of managing necessity” (Rancière 2012, 264, 
my translation). This statement might seem more 
restrictive than it actually is. What is necessary is the 
set of possibilities and impossibilities, the “landscape 
of the possible” that configures our consensual spaces 
at any given moment. What is not necessary are its 
various combinations —for the set is vast and can be 
combined in ways that were not “intended.”
For instance, we can think about how the above-
mentioned change in the consensual identity of 
immigrants in France in 1972, with modifications of laws 
and practices, facilitated ways of combining these new 
possibilities that engendered systemic exploitation of 
the sans-papiers in different sectors of the labor market 
in France. Certain employers took advantage of this 
change in the social order by employing undocumented 
immigrants and taking advantage of their precarious 
situation to impose harsh working conditions on them 
in order to produce greater profit than with workers 
in less precarious situations. Even though this practice 
is illegal, the logic is entirely consensual: The employer 
takes advantage of the place to which the undocumented 
immigrant has been assigned, combining and articulating 
different elements of the set of possibilities and 
impossibilities that characterize it. We thus see that the 
connection between legality and consensus is not simply 
a question of what is legal as opposed to what is illegal: 
the consensual logic can function in illegal ways. The 
question is rather the distribution of what is possible 
and the ways in which one can combine and articulate 
certain possibilities against certain impossibilities (for 
instance, the undocumented immigrant’s impossibility 
of reporting this illegality to state authorities).
Political Dis-Identification
It is also this way of posing and dealing with 
problems within the established set of possibilities 
and impossibilities that explains the “disagreement” 
between police and politics. The police are only able to 
situate themselves within their own consensual set of 
possibilities and impossibilities, and are thus neither 
able to “hear” nor to take into account the radical nature 
of the problems posed in politics —radical because what 
politics seeks is precisely to reconfigure and alter the 
very distribution of possibilities and impossibilities. This 
is why Rancière claims: “The police order constructs 
itself as that which no longer confronts legitimate 
conflictive instances [...], but only erratic, pathological or 
criminal acts” (Rancière 2012, 266, my translation).
We can see a concrete example of this in the State of 
Alabama vs. M. L. King, Jr. trial on the 19th of March 1956 
in the context of the Montgomery bus boycott at the 
beginning of the civil rights movement in the United 
States to struggle against the segregation laws. During 
the proceedings, the judge questions Gladys Moore, 
who participated in the boycott (Burns 1997, 72):
JUDGE: Why did you stop taking the bus the 5th of 
December?
MOORE: Why did I stop?
JUDGE: Yes.
MOORE: Nobody told me to stop taking the bus.
JUDGE: That is not what I asked you.
MOORE: I’ll explain it to you. I had nothing to do 
with it.
JUDGE: That is not what I asked you.
MOORE: What is your question?
JUDGE: I asked you why you stopped taking the bus 
on the 5th of December. I would like to know, in 
order to understand, why you didn’t take the bus 
anymore after the 5th of December.
MOORE: I stopped taking the bus because we have 
been mistreated for so many years that we decided 
never to take the bus again.
JUDGE: Whom are you referring to in saying “we”?
MOORE: The fifty thousand black people in 
Montgomery.
In the police order of the United States where 
segregation laws were in force in the southern states, 
the skin color “black” was an essential, identificatory 
mark for conduct in social spaces, for institutional 
possibilities and guarantees, for social codes and 
violence, for the labor market, etc. In other words, 
if the skin color “black” was heavily codified, it was 
because a whole social order was organized on the basis 
of it —its landscape of the possible and its construction 
of consensual spaces. In this court scene, the judge is 
trying to “understand” the abnormal act of the bus 
boycott. The act was not a crime as such, but seeing that 
two thirds of the bus passengers were black, it posed, 
on the one hand, an important economic problem 
for the city bus company and thus for the mayor of 
Montgomery, while on the other hand, it involved a 
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different visibility and a polemical presence of blacks 
in Montgomery because 30,000 black people organized 
their daily transportation to school and to work in a 
new and different way —by walking and by collectively 
organizing free transport service. This was a political 
dis-identification: It was a reconfiguration of the givens 
that structured the social spaces in Montgomery, a 
reconfiguration of the functionality and the modes of 
visibility of the elements occupying said space, of the 
existential territories and the possibilities attached to 
those territories. It was a form of dissensus that, by 
interrupting the normal functioning of social space 
in Montgomery, gave new meanings to bodies, things 
and words, changing their connections, oppositions, 
contents and functions, thus rearranging their network 
of interactions and thereby installing a new, polemical 
“landscape of the possible” in the heart of the social 
order. What we see in the above-mentioned court scene 
is the condensation of this dis-identification: Gladys 
Moore re-signifies this abnormal act in a political 
register as a protest against the social order as such, 
as a dissensual act that materializes a wrong involving 
the global structure of that social space in the United 
States —i.e., the heavy codification of “black” skin color 
through segregation laws and their very real, existential 
consequences for marginalized black people. In other 
words, the radical nature of the problem exceeds what 
the consensual set of possibilities and impossibilities 
of the police is able to take into account —because the 
political wrong is directed directly against this set and 
is materialized by dissensual acts at the heart of the 
matter. There is thus a gap between police and politics, 
a site of incommensurability that incites processes 
of experimentation on both sides —for the police to 
resist the contingency of their own order, and for 
politics to redistribute its own set of possibilities and 
impossibilities for defining the social order.
If the problem in utopian over-identification is 
constructed as teleological adjustment, and in police 
identification as recombinations of the consensual 
set of possibilities and impossibilities, how is the 
problem then to be constructed in terms of political 
dis-identification? Whereas in the case of the police, the 
problem is always to a certain extent predetermined 
by the set of possibilities and impossibilities within 
which they must situate it — thus making all problems 
dependent on the consensual landscape of the 
possible— the horizon of the problem is “broken open” 
in politics by dis-identification from this consensual 
landscape of the possible. The problem is thus “freed” 
from its consensual predetermination. What matters 
in politics is not the “reasonability” of the problems, 
but the need to deal with them, to experiment with 
them, to restructure the social order in which they 
are systemically reproduced. The horizon of possible 
solutions is open, something to be constructed along 
the way; it is one of open and collective experimentation 
with everything that is possible in our world.
How then, are we to understand the “internal” form 
of the problem in terms of political dis-identification? 
As Rancière says: “The relation of the local to the 
capacity of universalization [...] is very important for 
me in the definition of politics” (Rancière 2012, 275, my 
translation). The problems in politics exist as a type of 
short-circuit between the local and the universal, in 
two different senses. Firstly, because local problems 
become problems confronting society as such, 
surpassing their locality to confront the globality of 
the social order as the order within which these local 
problems are systemically reproduced. We could think 
of how the local bus boycott in Montgomery confronted 
the social order with the problem of segregation in 
Montgomery, which effectively exceeded its locality 
because segregation had structured social spaces and 
identities in the whole country. Secondly, because 
these local, but somehow universalized problems, 
have no legitimacy in themselves; they exist only 
by the dis-sensual insistence that they constitute 
problems addressing society as such, and thus, by their 
very form, they have to circulate, to create conditions 
of choice in spaces foreign to the movement itself, 
to be oriented by an open horizon where they have 
to pass through a multitude of wills, subjectivities 
and existing arrangements, to spread out, to make 
themselves visible, to universalize themselves as 
problems confronting society as such. The action of 
Rosa Parks can be seen in this light. Her dissensual 
act —her refusal to give up her seat to a white man 
on a bus in 1955, the dissensual act that sparked the 
Montgomery bus boycott— exceeded the locality of 
the act, of the bus company, of the city, of the specific 
system, in a process of universalization that continued 
all the way to the Supreme Court where segregation 
itself was eventually declared unconstitutional.
The problem of political dis-identification thus exists 
as a short-circuit between the local and the universal 
that opens an experimental and strategic horizon of the 
possible that extends beyond any consensual measure.
We can return rapidly here to the ideas we put forward 
in relation to the transition from the originary division 
to the gap. Firstly, when it comes to the difference 
between the state and the police, we can see in the 
civil rights movement how the dissensual problem of 
segregation also circulated within the state, invested 
different apparatuses, depended on different legal and 
social guarantees and protections (such as the right 
to question the constitutionality of a law in a court 
of law) —it circulated by creating conditions of choice 
within the state and by investing in a dissensual way 
a number of its devices. The devices of the state can 
therefore be configured in consensual, dissensual, 
and over-identificatory ways (the French government 
policy on undocumented immigrants exemplifies the 
last of these). Secondly, we can also see how these 
three logics can function at the same time within 
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a political movement. The civil rights movement 
dis-identified itself from the consensual order, from 
the codifications of black bodies, and from the places 
to which they were assigned. But this dis-identification 
had to invent its own practices —its own consensual 
distribution of roles and functions within the space 
of this dissensual rupture with the police. That is, in 
order for the universalization of its locality to last 
and circulate, it had to invent, as Rancière puts it in 
defining the police, an “order that assigns bodies 
to determined places because of what they have to 
do, because of their attributions and destinations” 
(Rancière 2001, 73, my translation). For instance, the 
Montgomery bus boycott had to experiment with an 
alternative transport system. As Taylor Branch says: 
“Each day, between 30,000 and 40,000 passengers 
refused to take the bus anymore. Subtracting those 
who walked and those who stayed at home, there 
was still a need to organize a transportation system 
for 20,000 passengers, which amounted to a total of 
130 trips a day for each of the volunteer cars” (Branch 
1988, 146). A total of 42 provisional stations were 
organized in the morning and 48 provisional stations 
at night in this alternative transport system, and black 
taxi drivers started charging only the equivalent of a 
bus fare for black passengers. We see here that there 
is a site of incommensurability existing within the 
political space itself, incommensurability between its 
dissensual logic of dis-identification from the social 
order and its consensual logic of redistribution of roles 
and functions in order to make the dissensual rupture 
last and to make the wrongs and problems materialized 
by this dissensus become universalized and circulate. 
This site of incommensurability incites processes of 
open, contingent and strategic experimentation, as 
can be clearly seen in the civil rights movement. We 
can also find elements of over-identification in the 
movement, such as in the way in which Christianity 
was mobilized: The social identities of “black” and 
“white” were over-identified as equal and harmonious 
from the perspective of Christian eternal justice, which 
turned the segregated social order into a symptom of 
the lack of this eternal justice and posed the problem in 
terms of a teleological adjustment between the social 
identity and the utopian over-identity. Once again, 
this was a site of incommensurability that incited 
processes of experimentation within the movement, 
particularly in relation to the very important role of 
the church as an institution.
We can see why there is a need to complexify Rancierian 
philosophy in relation to the anti-Machiavellian 
hypothesis, i.e., in developing the idea of an aesthetic 
cartography of social spaces fragmented by multiple 
gaps. Rancière does not provide a binary logic between 
police and politics, but it is not just a question of 
adding the third logic of over-identification either. 
We can see that the three logics of identification, 
dis-identification, and over-identification do not 
simply imply that a social space is fragmented by three 
gaps, because these experimental gaps also deploy 
themselves within a dissensual, political movement, 
within a utopian space, within a state policy, within 
counter-emancipatory movements as well as among 
all of these constructions. This is why, with the 
anti-Machiavellian hypothesis, we are moving away 
from a binary logic for thinking about contradictory 
relations of forces towards a fragmented, fluid, 
strategic field of incommensurable relations of forces.
Conclusion
There is a malaise in Rancière’s philosophy, which 
lies in the fact that he does not tell us what our 
problems are. This malaise makes him prey to both 
Marxist and Machiavellian misreadings. It exposes 
him to Marxist misreadings, because Marxism seeks 
to objectify the problem (capitalism as such) that 
should unite all wills (for purpose of the proletarian 
revolution), and it accuses Rancière of being a 
postmodernist (or something similar) because he 
supposedly turns emancipation into a goal in itself 
that is disconnected from any material object. It also 
subjects him to Machiavellian misreadings, because 
the originary division actually empties the objects 
and instrumental rationalities of political movements 
in order to generalize them as forces that generate 
the self-perpetuation of conflictive democracy. But 
there is another and more important reason for this 
malaise. What both Marxism and the Machiavellian 
tradition seek are conceptual guarantees to ensure 
that their own mode of politics is the solution to 
the problems they define. In the logic of Abensour, 
democratic politics is quite evidently conceptually 
guaranteed as the solution to the problem of the 
dominant logic of the state.
These philosophies might not be guaranteed to work 
in reality —one might defend the idea that they are 
contingent, paradoxical and heroic, that they might 
fail miserably because of contextual contingencies, 
etc.— but they are conceptually guaranteed to be 
the “right” logic in relation to the “real” problems of 
politics. This plays out very differently in the case 
of Rancière: His philosophy does not prove what 
our problems are as a function of its own logic. We 
choose our own problems, although we always do 
so within concrete distributions of the sensible and 
through configurations and reconfigurations of the 
sensible network of things, bodies and words. There 
is thus an ethics underlying Rancierian thought, 
and one might say that this is our ethical-political 
challenge: the problems we choose and —in order to 
invest and deal with these problems— the capabilities 
we invent, the sites of incommensurability we open 
up, and the processes of experimentation we play 
with and reconfigure ourselves in.
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